

# Conditionals as quotients: an algebraic approach

Tommaso Flaminio<sup>1</sup>, Francesco Manfucci<sup>2</sup>, and Sara Ugolini<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> IIA, CSIC

<sup>2</sup> Università di Siena

Conditional expressions are central in representing knowledge and reasoning abilities of intelligent agents. Conditional reasoning indeed features in a wide range of areas including non-monotonic reasoning, causal inference, learning, and more generally reasoning under uncertainty. A conditional statement is a hypothetical proposition of the form “If [antecedent] is the case, then [consequent] is the case”, where the antecedent is assumed to be true. Such a notion can be formalized by expanding the language of classical logic by a binary operator  $a/b$  that reads as “ $a$  given  $b$ ”. A most well-known approach in this direction is that of Stalnaker [4,5], further analyzed also by Lewis [2], that in order to axiomatize the operator  $/$  ground their investigation on particular Kripke-like structures. In this contribution we base our approach instead in the algebraic framework, in a line of investigation initiated in [1].

The novel approach we propose here is grounded in the algebraic setting of Boolean algebras, where there is a natural way of formalizing conditional statements. Indeed, given a Boolean algebra  $\mathbf{B}$  and an element  $b$  in  $B$ , one can define a new Boolean algebra, say  $\mathbf{B}/b$ , intuitively obtained by assuming that  $b$  is true. More in details, one considers the congruence collapsing  $b$  and the truth constant 1, and then  $\mathbf{B}/b$  is the corresponding quotient. Then the idea is to define a conditional operator  $/$  such that  $a/b$  represents the element  $a$  as seen in the quotient  $\mathbf{B}/b$ , mapped back to  $\mathbf{B}$ . The particular structural properties of Boolean algebras allow us to do so in a natural way.

First, we assume the algebra  $\mathbf{B}$  to be finite. Then, if  $b \neq 0$  the quotient  $\mathbf{B}/b$  is actually a *retract* of  $\mathbf{B}$ , which means that if we call  $\pi_b$  the natural epimorphism  $\pi_b : \mathbf{B} \rightarrow \mathbf{B}/b$ , there is an injective homomorphism  $\iota_b : \mathbf{B}/b \rightarrow \mathbf{B}$  such that  $\pi_b \circ \iota_b$  is the identity map. The idea is then to consider

$$a/b := \iota_b \circ \pi_b(a). \tag{1}$$

We observe that the map  $\iota_b$  is not uniquely determined, meaning that there can be different injective homomorphisms  $\iota, \iota'$  such that  $\pi_b \circ \iota = \pi_b \circ \iota'$  is the identity. Now, in order to be able to define an operator  $/$  over the algebra  $\mathbf{B}$ , one needs to consider all the different quotients, determined by all choices of elements  $b \in B$ . Then, if  $0 \neq b \leq c$ , by general algebraic arguments one gets a natural way of looking at nested conditionals; indeed it holds that  $(\mathbf{B}/c)/\pi_c(b) = \mathbf{B}/b$ , which means that  $\mathbf{B}/b$  is a quotient of  $\mathbf{B}/c$ , and actually also its retract. It is then natural to ask that the choices for  $\iota_b$  and  $\iota_c$  be *compatible*, in the sense that there is a way of choosing the embedding  $\iota_{\pi_c(b)}$  so that

$$\iota_b = \iota_c \circ \iota_{\pi_c(b)}, \tag{2}$$

which yields in particular that  $a/b = (a/b)/c$  whenever  $b \leq c$ .

The case where  $b = 0$  needs to be considered separately, since the associated quotient is the trivial algebra that cannot be embedded into  $\mathbf{B}$ . Since intuitively we are considering the quotients by an element  $b$  to mean that “ $b$  is true”, the *ex falso quodlibet* suggests that we map all elements to 1, i.e:

$$a/0 := 1. \quad (3)$$

The idea is then to use Stone duality to translate the above conditions to the dual setting; in other words, we generate the intended models as algebras of sets.

To this end, by the finite version of Stone duality, we now see the algebra  $\mathbf{B}$  as an algebra of sets, say that  $\mathbf{B} = \mathcal{S}(X)$  for a set  $X$ . Then the above reasoning translates to the following. Given  $Y \subseteq X$ , the natural epimorphism  $\pi_Y : \mathcal{S}(X) \rightarrow \mathcal{S}(Y)$  dualizes to the identity map  $\text{id}_Y : Y \rightarrow X$ , and the embedding  $\iota_Y : \mathcal{S}(Y) \rightarrow \mathcal{S}(X)$  dualizes to a surjective map  $f_Y : X \rightarrow Y$ , such that  $f_Y \circ \text{id}_Y = \text{id}_Y$ ; in other words, we are asking that  $f_Y$  restricted to  $Y$  is the identity. Moreover, consider  $Y \subseteq Z \subseteq X$ . Then the compatibility condition (2) becomes on the dual  $f_Y = f_Y^Z \circ f_Z$ , where  $f_Y^Z$  is the dual of the map  $\iota_{\pi_Z(Y)}$ . The intended models are those that originate by the above postulates; let us be more precise.

**Definition 1.** *Given a set  $X$ , we say that a class of surjective functions  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_Y^Z : Z \rightarrow Y : \emptyset \neq Y \subseteq Z \subseteq X\}$  with  $f_Y^Z : Z \rightarrow Y$  is compatible with  $X$  if:*

1.  $f_Y^X$  restricted to  $Y$  is the identity on  $Y$ ;
2.  $f_Y^X = f_Y^Z \circ f_Z^X$ .

We now define the class of intended models as algebras of sets.

**Definition 2.** *An intended model is an algebra with operations  $\{\wedge, \vee, \neg, /, 0, 1\}$  that is a Boolean algebra of sets  $\mathcal{S}(X)$  for some set  $X$  with  $/$  defined as follows from a class of functions  $\mathcal{F}$  compatible with  $X$ :*

$$Y/Z := (f_Z^X)^{-1}(Y \cap Z)$$

for any  $Y, Z \subseteq X$  and  $Z \neq \emptyset$ , and for any  $Y \subseteq X$  we set  $Y/\emptyset := X$ .

We then analyze the algebraic properties of the intended models and the variety they generate, showing also an interesting connection with Stalnaker’s approach to conditionals.

## References

1. Flaminio, T.; Godo, L.; and Hosni, H. 2020. Boolean algebras of conditionals, probability and logic. *Artificial Intelligence* 286:102237.
2. Lewis, D. 1973. *Counterfactuals*. Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
3. Lewis, D. 1976. Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. *The Philosophical Review* 85(3):297–315.
4. Stalnaker, R. 1968. A theory of conditionals. In Rescher, N., ed., *Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2)*. Blackwell. 98–112.
5. Stalnaker, R. C. 1970. Probability and conditionals. *Philosophy of Science* 37(1):64–80.